Retrieval experience as an accurate indicator of person identification in line-ups by Manzanero, Antonio et al.
The European Journal of Psychology Applied to Legal Context, 2011, 3(2): 129-140
www.usc.es/sepjf
Correspondence: Antonio L. Manzanero, Facultad de Psicología, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, 
Campus de Somosaguas, 28223, Madrid. E-mail: antonio.manzanero@psi.ucm.es
ISSN 1889-1861 © The European Journal of Psychology Applied to Legal Context
RETRIVAL EXPERIENCE AS AN ACCURATE INDICATOR OF 
PERSON IDENTIFICATION IN LINE-UPS
Antonio L. Manzanero*, Beatriz López**, and María José Contreras***
* Facultad de Psicología, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Campus de Somosaguas (Spain)
** Department of Psychology, University of Portsmouth(UK)
*** Facultad de Psicología. Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia (Spain)
(Received 23 December 2010; revised 4 April 2011; accepted 7 April 2011)
Abstract
Responses in eyewitness identification of a person 
in a line-up may be based on two types of recovery 
experiences, remember and know experiences. Remember 
responses involve eyewitness identification of the target 
person as an episodic memory task, because it implies 
retrieving information about the target person in the place 
and at the time of the event. Know responses, in contrast, 
engage recognition based on familiarity or perceptual 
facilitation, that is, as a semantic memory task. To explore 
the relation between retrieval experiences and recognition 
accuracy, 86 participants took part in a recognition task with 
two conditions: one with an interpolated target absent line-up 
and the other only with the target present line-up. Accuracy 
of recognition and retrieval experience was measured. The 
results showed that, having previously participated in a 
target-absent line-up, increased omissions, while the number 
of hits decreased. Furthermore, participants’ know responses 
were associated to false recognition, whilst remember 
responses were associated to hits in recognition. Thus, asking 
eyewitnesses to inform about the kind of retrieval experience 
in which they based their recognition responses, may serve as
a reliable indicator of accuracy in recognition. Future studies 
are needed to investigate whether this is also the case in 
natural settings.
Keywords: Remember-know experience, Eyewitness, 
Identification, Testimony, Line-ups, Person recognition.
Resumen
La identificación de una persona en una rueda de 
reconocimiento puede llevarse a cabo mediante dos tipos 
diferentes de experiencia de recuperación: recuerdo y 
conocimiento. Las respuestas basadas en el recuerdo 
suponen la identificación de una persona como una tarea de 
memoria episódica, dado que implican recuperar 
información sobre la persona objetivo y el contexto espacio-
temporal en que se produjo en suceso. Las respuestas 
basadas en el conocimiento, por el contrario, implican un 
reconocimiento basado en la familiaridad o respuestas de 
facilitación, como una tarea de memoria semántica. Para 
explorar la relación entre las experiencias de respuesta y la 
exactitud de los reconocimientos, 86 participantes tomaron 
parte en una tarea de reconocimiento de personas con dos 
condiciones: una con una rueda interpolada de objetivo 
ausente y la otra sólo con una rueda de objetivo presente. Se
midió la exactitud de las identificaciones y las experiencias 
de recuperación. Los resultados mostraron que la 
participación en una rueda previa con el objetivo ausente 
incrementaba las omisiones y disminuía los aciertos en la 
rueda con el objetivo presente. Además, las respuestas de 
saber estaban asociadas a errores en las identificaciones y 
las respuestas basadas en el recuerdo a aciertos. En 
consecuencia, solicitar a los testigos que informen de las 
experiencias de recuperación en las que basan sus 
reconocimientos podría ser un buen indicador de exactitud. 
Son necesarios nuevos estudios para evaluar si estos 
resultados se mantienen en contextos naturales.
Palabras clave: Juicios de recordar/saber, Testigo visual, 
Identificación, Testimonio, Experiencia de recuperación, 
Ruedas de identificación, Reconocimiento de personas.
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Introduction
Mandler (1980) defines recognition as a decision-making process based on the 
previous occurrence of an event. This process can be achieved using two different kinds 
of procedures: a) by evaluating familiarity or b) by identification as a result of memory 
recovery. According to Mandler (1980), the first procedure is direct and does not 
require conscious processing, while identification is indirect and requires a conscious 
process of elaboration.
Similarly, Jacoby and Dallas (1981) proposed that a recognition task can be 
accomplished through either judgements about perceptive fluidity or by decision-
making processes involving the recovery of the context in which the information was 
first coded. Perceptive recognition takes place only through the assessment of 
perceptual fluency, while for recognition by identification it is essential to recover the 
context in which the information was first acquired. Jacoby and Dallas (1981) suggest 
that perceptive fluidity processes are automatic and usually involve guessing while the 
processes that take place when participants need to recover the acquisition context to 
respond in an analytic manner (decision-making process) are conscious and controlled. 
Jacoby and Dallas (1981) liken their distinction to that proposed by Tulving 
(1972) who distinguishes between episodic and semantic memory. Recognition by 
identification would be the result of an episodic memory, because it relies on having 
previously formed an episodic trace, while perceptive recognition would be a semantic 
task that relies only on the activation of semantic information of the target item. This 
explains why variables such as level of processing of material relate to identification 
processes and not to perceptive recognition processes, since the level of processing 
affects the likelihood of forming an episodic trace (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981). Jacoby 
(1982) notes that the poor performance of patients with amnesia in recognition tasks 
may be due to an inability to elaborate information during the study and thus the 
reliance on perceptive recognition.
In semantic information retrieval the person is not aware of the context in which 
they acquired that knowledge. However, one of the main features of episodic memory is 
precisely that the person is conscious of recalling a previous experience (Tulving, 
1983). In the first case we talk about a know experience and in the second case of a 
remember experience. Thus, perceptive recognition (semantic memory task) does not 
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require the person to be aware of what s/he is recovering. Regarding the role of 
consciousness in recognition processes, Jacoby and Dallas (1981) propose that when 
recognition is based on perceptive fluidity, the person is not aware of retrieving 
information, whereas when recognition is based on elaboration processes there is 
conscious awareness.
Thus, the kind of experience that leads to each of the recovery experiences vary. 
Rajaram (1993) has proposed a continuum from controlled responses to automatic 
responses, where it is possible to distinguish between three types of responses: 
remember, know and implicit responses. When recovery is controlled a remember
response is produced (Gardiner, 1988; Rajaram, 1993; Tulving, 1985). In these 
responses participants are aware that the information recovered is a memory trace and 
therefore the information was experienced in a specific context of her/his life with 
specific time and spatial characteristics (autonoetic consciousness).
In automatic recovery there are two types of response (i.e., Gardiner, 1988; 
Gardiner & Java, 1990; Rajaram, 1993). On the one hand, know responses, that is, 
responses in which the participant is not aware that the information has been 
experienced in the past, but is aware of having the knowledge. This is, what Tulving 
(1985) called noetic consciousness where there is awareness of the knowledge but not 
of the context in which this knowledge was acquired. On the other hand, there would be 
an even more automatic response in which the participant is not even aware that s/he 
has, or is using, this knowledge, these are implicit responses (Rajaram, 1993). These are 
responses in which there is no awareness of knowledge or the context in which it was 
acquired (anoetic consciousness).
Most of the investigations that aim to study recovery experiences in recognition 
tasks are based on a paradigm developed by Tulving (1985) that examines participants’ 
judgements about know and remember experiences.
Remember/Know paradigm
Tulving (1985) developed an experimental paradigm that allows the study of 
recovery experiences through participants’ judgements of their own experiences, 
showing that it is possible for participants to discriminate between responses from an 
actual memory (remember responses), and responses based on knowledge (know 
responses) and that these responses are sensitive to variables such as retention interval 
and level of processing. Gardiner (1988) for instance, using the same paradigm, found 
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that the level of processing (generating a word vs. reading a word) affected the ease 
with which words were recognised but only when words had been judged to be 
remembered. Generated words were more easily recognised than read words when 
participants identified the words as being consciously remembered (remember), 
whereas no differences were found for words that had been identified as familiar (know) 
but had not been consciously remembered.
From these experiments it can be concluded that explicitly asking participants to 
make this judgement does not pose difficulties, and that they can reliably discriminate 
between remembered and known items. These data provide information about the 
phenomenological characteristics of memories and, in turn, these provide valuable 
information about what is recovered in order to perform a task.
An open question however is the extent to which accuracy of person recognition 
is conditioned by recovery experience. It could be argued that know experiences should 
lead to worse performance in recognition tasks, given that familiarity judgements do not 
discriminate between two people that look similar, while recognition based on 
remember responses would place one specific person as seen previously in a given 
context, even if the two people look alike. The results from a study by Rajaram (1993, 
Experiment 3) investigating memory for word lists provide indirect support for this 
prediction as the results showed that false alarms were associated with experiences of 
knowing. 
The potential relationship between recovery experience and accuracy could be 
however be influenced by other factors (Horry, Wright, & Tredoux, 2010; Meissner, 
Tredoux, Parker, & Maclin, 2005). It could be argued that insofar as memory traces 
deteriorate as the result of the effect of different variables such as delay, multiple 
retrieval or retrieval strategies. The relationship between experience and accuracy of 
memory could also be affected by these variables. For example, Mäntylä (1997) argues 
that remember experiences and know experiences are affected by the strategies 
employed by participants, which in turn would affect the discriminability of items. The 
fact that face recognition however is based on holistic and not feature processing 
(Tanaka & Farah, 1993) allows for an alternative interpretation of the results of 
Mäntylä’s study because processing facial features does not increase discriminability 
but actually hinders recognition (Woodhead, Baddeley, & Simmonds, 1979), and hence 
the results of the Experiment 4 in Mäntylä’s study (1997) which show that participants 
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who had processed faces by features reported fewer remember experiences when 
several photographs of the same person were presented. 
Nevertheless, if in face recognition tasks, the relationship between recovery 
experience and accuracy remained constant, participants’ assessment about the recovery 
experience that leads them to make a decision in a recognition line-up could be an 
additional source of valuable information to assess the reliability of their decision. Past 
studies show that speed may be a reliable predictor of reliability of participants’ 
responses. Valentine, Pickering and Darling (2003), for instance, found fast decisions 
are more likely to result in the identification of a suspect (87%) than average or slow 
decisions (38% vs. 31%), indicating that differences in decision speeds are associated 
with differences in identification outcomes in real cases. Also Sauerland and Sporer 
(2009) have shown increased reliability based on a combination of response time and 
confidence. The majority of studies however tend to show that indicators such as 
confidence or latency response are rather unreliable predictors of accuracy (Bothwell, 
Brigham, & Deffenbacher, 1987; Luna & Martín-Luengo, 2010; Weber, Brewer, Wells, 
Semmler, & Keast, 2004). 
To test the hypothesis that recovery experience may be a reliable predictor of 
accuracy, participants were asked to identify a face seen previously in two line-ups
comprising of six photographs: one line-up contained the target photograph, and, in the 
other line-up, the target photograph was absent. Interpolating a target absent line-up has 
shown to have a strong interference effect on recognition (Deffenbacher, Bornstein, & 
Penrod, 2006). An additional aim of this study was to examine whether this interference 
effects may be affected by recovery experience.
Method
Participants
The study involved 86 participants, 64 women with an average age of 18.43 
(SD=1.69) years and 22 men with an average age of 19.27 (SD=2.43). All of them were 
psychology students from the Universidad Complutense of Madrid (Spain) and had no 
expertise on eyewitness testimony.
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Design and procedure
An unifactorial design was applied to examine the accuracy of identification and 
retrieval experience in absent of the target in the line-up. As for the target-present line-up,
a 3 (accuracy of the response: omission, false alarm and hit) X 2 (interpolated line-up: yes 
vs. no) design was employed to study the effects of interpolating a line-up and the 
accuracy of the responses of the eyewitnesses, in, following Tulving (1985), the 
experience of recovering (remember/know responses). For post-hoc analyses, the 
Bonferroni correction was applied to correct for multiple comparisons.
All subjects began the experimental procedure by viewing the Learning Phase for 
10 seconds. They were told to pay attention to the face and try to remember it for later 
recognition in the experimental session. Following this presentation, participants 
performed a distractor task, consisting of a Sudoku, for 5 minutes. When the allotted time 
was up for the distractor task, subjects in the interpolated target-absent line-up conditions 
were told that they would see a second slide and that they should judge whether any of the 
six individuals in this line-up was the same person as in the first photo by marking the 
number of the corresponding photo or the alternative response “no-one”. Then they 
informed if the decision was based on a remember or know response. During this time, 
subjects in the no interpolated absent-target line-up conditions performed a second 
distractor task like in the first one.
Finally, all subjects tried to identify the target person in the present-target line-up
and informed again about the kind of the response. They were told that they would see a 
set of six photographs of faces and that they should look for the person they had seen in the 
earlier slide.
Materials
The target photograph was a front photograph of a young Caucasian man (around 
20 years old) with dark hair, and dressed in black. The distractor photographs were of men 
of the same sex, race, and approximate age (around 20 years) as the target, had similar hair 
colour and style, and were in similar black cloths, none had distinguishing special features. 
The distractor photographs were chosen on the basis of their physical resemblance with the 
target from a selection of 98 photographs of psychology students from the Universidad 
Autónoma of Madrid (Spain). Thus no previous differences were observed among them.
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Two different line-ups were building with these photographs. Target-absent line-up 
contained six faces in two rows at the same slide. Target-present line-up was in a similar 
way including the target face in the fifth position. None of the individuals in either line-up
appeared in the other line-up. The photos were projected from slides onto a blank white 
wall.
A questionnaire was also used, which included the distractor task (sudoku puzzle 
game), the identification questions and a final question asking them whether their 
responses were based on remember or know recovery experiences (Tulving, 1985).
Results
Accuracy
In the target absent line-up, the probability of false alarms (44%) was equal to 
the probability of correct rejections (56%),  
2
(1) = 0.58, ns, that is, the probability of
error and hit is the same with the target absent in the line-up.
In the target-present line-up, a 3 (accuracy of identifications: omission, false 
alarm, and hit) x 2 (interpolated line-up: yes vs. no) chi squared yielded significant 
!"##$%$&'$()* 
2
(2) = 14.62, p < .001. Post hoc analysis with bonferroni correction (.05/3 
+*,-./0*"&!"'12$!*2312*23$*4%5616"7"28*5#*3"2(*91(*(":&"#"'1&278*:%$12$%)* 
2
(1) = 11.77, p <
.001, ;
2
= .176, in the non-interpolated line-up condition (87.5%) than in the 
interpolated condition (48,6%), while more omissions were reported in the interpolated 
condition (79.2%) than in the non-interpolated (34%). Post hoc also indicate that the 
4%5616"7"28*5#*#17($*171%<(*1&!*3"2(*91(*("<"71%)* 
2
(1) = 2.23, ns, ;
2
= .056, in the non-
interpolated line-up than the interpolated line-up conditions. Finally, the probability of 
5<"(("5&(*1&!*#17($*171%<(*91(*1&175:5=(*"&*6523*'5&!"2"5&()* 
2
(1) = 0.08, ns, ;
2
= .017.
In short, having previously participated in a target-absent line-up increased the 
omissions, while the number of hits decreased.
As for those submitted to target absent line-up, a 3 (accuracy of identifications:
omission, false alarm, and hit) X 2 (target absent line-up identification: false alarm vs. 
correct rejection) chi squared showed no significant differences in the identification in 
the target present line-up,  
2
(2) = 3.50, ns.
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Retrieval experience
Responses for retrieval experiences were measured on a scale from 1 to 10 
where low responses represented know responses based on familiarity and high 
responses represented remember responses. An ANOVA perfomed in the target absent 
condition with accuracy of identifications as the with-participants factor (false alarms 
vs. correct rejections) showed a significant main effect of accuracy of responses, 
F(1,41) = 9.18, p >*)-.)*?
2
= .183, 1-@*+*,AB.)*"&!"'12"&:*2312*remember responses (i.e., 
episodic memory) were associated to hits (M = 6.96), while false alarms were associated 
to know responses (i.e., semantic memory), that is, responses based on perceptual 
facilitation or familiarity.
A 3 (accuracy of identifications: omission, false alarm, and hit) x 2 (interpolated 
line-up: yes vs. no) ANOVA on the retrieval experience revealed a significant effect of 
accuracy of the identifications, F(2,80) = 15.47, p <.001, ?
2
= .001 1-@ = .061, but not 
for the interpolated line-up, F(1,80) = 0.10, ns, ?
2
= .183, 1-@ = .841, nor for the 
interaction between accuracy and interpolated line-up, F(1,80) = 1.08, ns, ?
2
= .026, 1-@
= .232. Post hoc analysis with Bonferroni correction (.05/3 = .017) exhibited that false 
alarm (M = 2.92) and omission (M = 6.34) responses were more linked to a semantic 
memory, whilst hit responses (M = 8.17) were linked to an episodic memory.
Discussion
The first result worth noting from this study is the large number of false alarms, 
equal to correct rejections, found in the target-absent first line-up. These results are in 
line with a study by Peters (1987) with children aged 3 to 8 years showing 71% of 
misidentifications in a target-absent line-up, or the study by King and Yuille (1987) 
who found that 74% of children between 8 and 11 years and 36% of children aged 13 
and 14 years engaged in non-correct identification in a target-absent line-ups, even 
when participants were warned that the person to identify may have not been at the line-
up. This supposes that the judgement strategy followed by the eyewitnesses was to 
maximize the identifications without considering the mistakes i.e. false alarms, while, in 
judicial setting, none misidentification is expected.
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Secondly, the results of this study confirm the negative effect of interpolating 
line-ups, as these lead to a decreased correct identifications and increased omissions, in 
line with Deffenbacher, Bornstein and Penrod’s (2006) meta-analysis.
In relation to recovery experience, this has an effect on the accuracy of 
identifications in the line-up, as responses of familiarity (know responses) seem to lead 
to more false identifications and fewer hits than identification responses (remember). 
Moreover, the relationship between the type of response in terms of its accuracy and 
recovery experience was not significantly affected by the interpolation of line-ups, even 
though the distance of the distributions between hits and false alarms decreased.
Previous studies suggest that evaluating participants’ confidence in their own 
responses is not a good predictor of the accuracy of recognition (Bothwell, Brigham, & 
Deffenbacher, 1987; Brewer, 2006), and neither is the latency response (Brewer, Caon, 
Todd & Weber, 2006; Weber, Brewer, Wells, Semmler, & Keast, 2004). However, 
according to various authors (Tulving, 1985; Gardiner, 1988), participants are able to 
reliably evaluate the type of recovery experience. The results of this study suggest that 
this evaluation may be a good predictor of accuracy of recognition. It could therefore be 
useful to ask eye-witnesses before an identification line-up to report on the type of 
experience recovery that leads them to make the decision, that is, assessing whether 
they actually remember the person (identification) or the person looks familiar (know). 
Responses based on familiarity should be discarded as they lead the increased risk of 
errors, and in particular, increased false identifications (Horry, Wright, & Tredoux, 
2010; Meissner, Tredoux, Parker, & Maclin, 2005).
Interestingly, the relationship between recovery experience and accuracy of 
identification remained constant in the different conditions of interference caused by the 
interpolation of a target-absent line-up. It is important however to ascertain in further 
research the possible influence of other factors such as delay, number of perpetrators or 
previous descriptions, on this relationship, before applying these indices in everyday 
(Brewer & Wells, 2006). Moreover, differences between laboratory and natural settings 
would be taken into consideration as some studies show there may be important 
differences between the two settings (Behrman & Richards, 2005; Fariña, Arce, & Real, 
1994).
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